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Background
With the development of internet of things (IoT), smart home appliances have been 
released. For instance, all home appliances for living, such as smart TVs, smart refrigera-
tors, smart washers, and smart cooling and heating devices, have come to get connected 
to internet and make people’s lives convenient. These days, the smart home service capa-
ble of integrating and managing the devices has globally developed. The smart home ser-
vice is like a personal household based on automation. It has the system of controlling 
the internal and external factors of a house, such as lighting, temperature, doors, and 
windows. The smart home service is able to set lighting, temperature, music, and TV 
programs differently depending on whether a person is at home and a user’s experience 
and preference [1–3].
These days, with the use of smartphones, it is possible to check home conditions, oper-
ate cooling and heating devices through temperature and humidity sensors, and control 
home lighting and TV to look as if a house is not empty [4, 5]. Also, in interoperation 
with smart devices, the smart home service offers living convenience in consideration of 
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a user’s living pattern and its accumulated experience. In other words, a user is able to 
control and monitor all home places with smartphone [6–8]. As such, the smart home 
service makes it possible for users to control their house regardless of time and space 
through smartphone. Although it is convenient and controls all home appliances, it has 
factors exposed to security threats, financial and psychological. Since smartphones sup-
ported various activities, such as financial affairs, business affairs, and personal affairs, 
the security technology of smartphones has been developed. However, the smart home 
appliances for smart home fail to have security technology and get exposed to many 
attacks [7, 9, 10]. Therefore, this paper proposes the internal security framework for 
smart devices, which can be applied to smart home appliances as well as smartphones. 
The proposed security framework uses self-signing technology to have defense against 
other infiltrating codes and executable programs and block execution flow. In addition, 
we explain the functions of modules which are limited by access control to protect the 
modules of home appliances in smart home.
This thesis is comprised of as follows: “Related works” section introduces the technol-
ogy and research trend of smart home security and describes matters to be considered 
for security; “The proposed framework” section proposes an internal security frame-
work for smart devices; the “Discussion” section describes a comparative analysis with 
related works; “Conclusions” section presents the conclusion of this study.
Related works
Since home appliances have wireless network function built in, smart home has pro-
vided a lot of services for users. Through wireless network, a user is able to control home 
appliances, lighting, and cooling and heating devices and receive services regardless of 
time and space. Smart home provides more convenient and useful services, for all home 
appliances get automated and smart. For useful services, a diversity of sensor infor-
mation, customized personal information (hobbies, habits, medical service, etc.), and 
financial information are used. For the reason, security technology should be applied 
[7, 9–11]. This section describes the structure and security matters of smart devices in 
smart home, and the previous studies related to smart home security.
Architecture of smart device
By investigating such related works as [12–16], these researchers drew the structure of 
smart devices which can be applied to smart home. The structure of smart devices con-
sists of four layers: application layer, application framework, module core library, and 
Linux kernel layer.
In application layer, applications running in smart devices are defined. In a smart 
home environment, there are a diversity of applications, such as games, launcher, health-
care application, set up, and video. These applications are not unique functions of smart 
devices, but they are developed by developers and third-party, running in smart devices.
In application framework, libraries, manager, and others to enable applications to run 
in smart devices are defined. The manager includes activity manager, package manager, 
and install manager, and manages libraries and files in execution.
Module core library processes the unique functions of smart devices. Each module in 
a smart device has its own unique function. For example, a smart TV has such modules 
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as TV middleware for receiving images and displaying them on screen, player for playing 
images, TV configuration, and I/O kit. The modules execute each unique function of a 
device and can be inserted only by a relevant manufacturer.
Linux kernel layer executes the most core function of a smart device. It includes file 
system, network, kernel and device driver, and manufacturers change Linux kernel for 
each device function. In addition, it monitors the functional execution of a module and 
application, and exits or reruns execution.
Security requirements for smart home
In a smart home environment, services are provided over wireless network. An attacker 
is able to access or invade a smart device on the wireless network.
In this study, the security requirements for safe smart home service, including integ-
rity, availability, and authentication, are discussed.
Integrity
A smart device can be accessed over wireless network, so that it needs security system. 
An attacker is able to insert a malignant software application and change a service pur-
pose through a malicious code. For the reason, without integrity, the whole smart home 
system can be infected with a malicious code by an attacker and thereby the availability 
of smart home service can fall. Therefore, the integrity of smart home service is required. 
To ensure the integrity of smart devices, it is essential to use a hash function and a digital 
signature for critical data or module codes [16–18].
Availability
A smart device sends and receives data to and from the outside over wireless network. If 
an attacker steals data, it is possible to fabricate and modify the data. The fabricated data 
can cause malfunction of a smart device which deteriorates a user’s availability of smart 
device. The deteriorated availability can lead to device overload that triggers a fire, and 
the malfunction can bring about financial losses like a rise in electric rate and the risk 
of life. To secure availability, it is required to limit other actions than essential functions 
and grant rights for functional access by making strong access control [7, 11, 16, 19].
Authentication
There are many devices whose security is not taken into account. If an attacker insert 
a copied module or a malignant code in a smart device, it is possible to contaminate a 
smart home service environment and make the device used for malicious purposes, such 
as distributed denial of service (DDoS), denial of service (DoS), and personal informa-
tion leakage. Moreover, if an attacker disguises a modified module as a normal mod-
ule, the module can serve as the secret backdoor for malicious action which can lower 
the function of the normal module and thereby deteriorate availability. Therefore, it is 
required to provide authentication of a smart device. For the authentication, it is pos-
sible to use a certificate [18–20].
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Existing studies of smart home security
In this section, the previous works related to the service and security in smart home are 
looked into.
The firmware validation and update scheme proposed by Choi et al. [12] performs ID-
based authentication between devices in a smart home environment and uses the key 
derivation algorithm for firmware image distribution. To verify the integrity of firmware 
image, it uses a hash chain. Firmware image is used as an input of the hash chain and is 
fragmented. The scheme transmits the pieces fragmented by firmware fragmentation, 
and put the transmitted pieces to the hash chain for verification.
The user privacy-enhanced security architecture proposed by Lee et al. [14] is applied 
in a smart home environment. The architecture has defense against such attacks as per-
sonal information hijacking and burst attack between an attacker and devices in a smart 
home environment. The study proposed a security framework applicable to a smart 
home environment, which includes encryption, access control, digital signature, authen-
tication, and logging.
The framework proposed by Tomanek et al. [21] is based on the open source frame-
work ‘AllJoyn’. It is comprised of device, AllJoyn Core, permission module, and ACLs 
and policy certificate trust anchor. In the framework, critical data are transmitted after 
authentication between devices. End-user’s security manager provides security provi-
sioning and maintenance service for devices. A session is established between the appli-
cations of devices for data transmission. Authentication is performed with the use of a 
group key and a certificate. Authenticated devices transmit the messages encrypted with 
a given policy.
The lightweight lattice-based homomorphic privacy-preserving aggregation scheme 
proposed by Abdallah et al. [22] uses the authentication process of smart devices and 
lightweight lattice-based homomorphic cryptosystem to encrypt a message. It is divided 
into initialization phase and reading aggregation phase. Since the scheme makes it pos-
sible to monitor authentication between smart devices, control center, smart meter, and 
communication between APs, the control center is able to decrypt an encrypted mes-
sage to improve confidentiality and privacy of devices.
To authenticate smartphones and send messages safely in a smart home environment, 
Mantoro et  al. [23] uses an encryption algorithm and a hash function. The algorithm 
applies AES256, ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange, and RC4-based hash function. 
With the use of a central hub, all messages to transmit are monitored, and the messages 
sent by smartphones pass the central hub for transmission. A message to transmit is 
encrypted with three algorithms, and a hash value is generated.
The proposed framework
In this section, the proposed framework is discussed in detail. The framework is com-
prised of module level and kernel level. The architecture of the framework is illustrated 
in Fig. 1.
Architecture
A smart device basically consists of modules which run the functions dependent on each 
device, and kernel which monitors and controls modules and module operation. It does 
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not influence a running module and monitors an attack action. This framework is made 
up of smart appliance module, appliance integrity module, mandatory access control 
framework, and appliance integrity protection framework.
Smart appliance module is a functional module running in a smart device. It executes 
a basic function, rather than a particular function.
Appliance integrity module monitors all modules of a smart device. The modules of 
a smart device can run only when they have a manufacturer’s signature. The modules 
without the signature exit by force.
Mandatory access control framework executes access control for all running modules. 
Each module has its own execution right and role. If a module executes an operation irrel-
evant to its role or has a different right, the module operation is limited by a system call.
Appliance integrity protection framework plays a role to examine actual self-signing. 
It has a list of signed modules and hash values saved. By comparing a hash value and a 
module name in the saved list, it checks whether a module has a manufacturer’s signa-
ture. If a hash value and a module name are not found in the saved list, the module is 
classified as a newly added module and its signature is checked again.
Module level
In this section, module level applicable to a smart device is described. Module level is 
comprised of authentication module, smart appliance module, and appliance integrity 
module.
Authentication module
In a smart home environment, smart devices transmit data over wireless network. A 
variety of data are exchanged between devices. Such data can leak if an unauthorized 
device accesses the smart home environment. All smart devices in the environment per-
form authentication process through authentication module.
Fig. 1 Security framework inside the home appliances
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Smart appliance module
This module is dependent on a smart device. Each smart device has its own unique func-
tion. Diverse home appliances, such as refrigerators, cooling & heating devices, boilers, 
TVs, and lighting apparatus, perform their functions for user convenience. This module 
is used to express the unique functions abstractly.
Appliance integrity module
This module runs in the same level of mart appliance module. It monitors other newly 
created or inserted modules than the modules of manufacturers and validates integrity. 
Figure 2 shows check for signature flag function.
Kernel level
All functions of smart devices are controlled by embedded kernel. For integrity valida-
tion, the core framework is also executed in kernel level which is made up of mandatory 
access control framework and appliance integrity protection framework.
Mandatory access control framework
To execute a newly added module in a smart device, it is required to define module 
authentication and proper execution rights and roles of modules.
Authentication
A newly added module or an existing module installed by a manufacturer should be 
authenticated. Authentication module performs the module authentication process. The 
authentication module in the framework authenticates all modules when a smart device 
is powered on. The authentication process is pairing process.
Pairing process
In the authentication process, a certificate is created, issued, and verified with a manufac-
turer’s private key. The issued certificate has a variety of information on a smart device, 
Sub CheckforSignatureFlag( )
   existing_Module = 
CheckforModule(Module_Name)
   If existing_Module = True Then
     If SignatureFlag is "Signed" Then
 Print "Success"
        Call_Appliance Integrity Protection 
Framework:
        SubFunction( )
     else If SignatureFlag is "Non-Signed" Then
 RequestKillModule(Module_Name)
   End If
   If existing_Module = False Then         
     Call_Appliance Integrity Protection Framework:
     SubFunction( )
   End If
END Sub
Fig. 2 Pseudo code of check for signature flag function
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including a hash value of module ID, device name, device version, manufacturer’s public 
key ID, issuer, and issuing time. Whether a module is already installed or newly added 
is checked, and each module requests Authentication Module for authentication. At the 
same time of request, a certificate is transmitted. Table 1 shows the terms explanation.
The following case shows that an existing module gives an authentication request to 
authentication module.
Authentication module already saves a manufacturer’s public key which is used to 
check a relevant module’s certificate. A manufacturer’s public is searched for with MF, 
KMF_pub and ID.
In the case of a newly added module, authentication module doesn’t have the module 
manufacturer’s public key. Therefore, authentication module requests certificate author-
ity to send a public key and save the key newly.
Once pairing process is complete, authentication module returns result values to a rel-
evant module. The results values are module ID, the creation time of the results value, 
module name, module version, and checked flag. They are encrypted with a manufac-
turer’s public key before being transmitted. If authentication successes, checked flag has 
“Permitted”; if authentication fails, it has “not permitted”. Authentication module saves 
result values. After that, if the same module is inserted, the module checks checked flag 
of the result values, and, if “not Permitted”, it makes an authentication request again.
Access control
The header of each module has its information section where there is module informa-
tion. In the information section, module name, version, permission, identifier, instal-
lation path, role, and other information are saved. Figure  3 presents the information 
section of the header in a module.
Deliver ME → AM : Cert ME =
[
Hash(MID), C_TS, MN, MV, MF, KMF_pubID
]
KMF_prv
Deliver MN → AM : Cert MN =
[
Hash(MID), C_TS, MN, MV, MF, KMF_pubID
]
KMF_prv
Return AM → ME or MN : Result = [Hash(MID), CF, CF_TS, MV, MN] KMF_pub
Table 1 Terms explanation
Terms Explanation
ME/MN/AM Existing/new module/authentication module
MF/CA Manufacturer/certificate authority
Hash () Hash function
Sigx()/Veryy() Signature algorithm using x key/
Verification algorithm using y key
Cert Certificate
Kx_prv/Kx_pub Private key of X/public key of X
MID/MN/MV Module identifier/module name/module version
X_TS Time stamp values of X
CF Checked flag
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Permission specifies the right of module execution. Allow module is the identifier of a 
module that can access information on the current module. The detailed roles are pre-
sented in Table 2.
A role is divided into name and value. Each name has the value of Boolean, String, or 
Integer. Such a role should be specified by a manufacturer and developer before a mod-
ule is executed. Once the module is executed, it is impossible to change and edit the role.
In reference to the information section, a list for access control is created. The list is 
used for module monitoring and signing validation of appliance integrity protection 
framework. A list is generated on the basis of module information and roles which are 
used to make only essential functions of a module executed. The information section of 
module header has no ‘write’ permission in order for an attacker not to change a role at 
its discretion. Table 3 displays an example of role reference list.
A list created by access control consists of module name, permission, role, and value. For 
instance, the execution permission of a camera module should be user permission in which 
it is possible to access a photo and run as the frontend module of a smart device. Recog-
nizeVoice module should be operated with user permission in which it is possible to call an 
installed application but impossible to write a character and access the passwords stored.
Appliance integrity protection framework
All modules in a smart should have integrity. Although an attacker makes a fabrication, 
it is possible to endure integrity through verification. appliance integrity protection 
framework is divided into module monitoring and signing validation.
Module monitoring
Module monitoring monitors an existing module and a newly added module. Running 
together with appliance integrity module, it delivers information on a newly added mod-
ule to singing validation so as to check integrity. Figure 4 presents Pseudo Code of Mod-
uleMonitoring Function.
The called ModuleMonitoring function checks the integrity of an operating module or 
a module in ready. CheckforModule function checks if the module exists already. Load-
RoleTable function loads the role list of a relevant module saved in Mandatory Access 
Fig. 3 Information section of the header in the module
Table 2 Examples of role list
Role Value Description
Allow-attach-debugger Boolean Debugger can be attached to module
Allow-save-to-X Boolean Output can be saved in the storage X
Allow-open-application Boolean In module, an application can be opened
Allow-perform-background Boolean Module can run in the background
Create-child-process Integer The number of child processes that a module can create
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Control Framework. The role of the module to check is extracted by ExtractRole func-
tion, and its results values MAC_List and Module_List are compared for integrity check. 
If the items of the list are different, the module exits by force. In addition, if the role that 
the module should not perform is given to Deny_Role_List and thereby the module tries 
to run the role in the list, it is required to prevent the execution of the module and exit 
the role by force if the role tries to be performed in the middle of running module.
Signing validation
the second phase of integrity verification is to test a code at the time when a module 
starts. Each module has the certificate signed by its manufacturer. It is checked that a 
module is signed already. Signing validation uses a hash function to check all codes of 
the module. In the process, the secondary integrity is verified. In this phase, whether 
there is any modification or fabrication of an attacker is checked.
For integrity verification, appliance integrity protection framework saves a list of hash 
values for module codes and is able to reject the execution of a module which is not 
matched in the saved hash list after mapping. Table 4 shows examples of hash values list.
A hash list is made up of module name, hash values, role table pointer, and pointer 
number. The hash values of a module are compared first, and then role matching is per-
formed again. For role matching, the role reference list created by mandatory access con-
trol framework is referred to. With the use of the pointer number of the role reference 
Table 3 Examples of role reference list
Pointer num Module name Permission Role Value
R1-0 Camera User Allow-save-to-photo True
R1-1 Camera User Allow-open-to-frontend True
R2-0 RecognizeVoice User Allow-open-application Ture
R2-1 RecognizeVoice User Allow-insert-to-string False
R2-2 RecognizeVoice User Allow-access-passwdstore False
Sub ModuleMonitoring( )
   Do Forever
   existing_Module = 
CheckforModule(Module_Name)
   MAC_List = LoadRoleTable(Module_Name)
   Deny_Role_List = “Allow-attach-debugger”
   Module_List = ExtractRole(Module_Name)
   If existing_Module = True Then
     If MAC_List = Module_List Then
 Print "GOOD"
        #performing the module
        SubFunction( )
     else
 RequestKillModule(Module_Name)
   End If
   If Module_List = Deny_Role_List Then
     RequestKillModule(Module_Name)
   End If
END Sub
Fig. 4 Pseudo code of ModuleMonitoring function
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list, a list value is saved and compared. This process is performed before the module is 
executed. Therefore, it is possible to make the secondary integrity verification.
Discussion
In this section, the proposed frame work is compared with relevant works in terms of 
the security factors in a smart home environment: authentication, integrity, and avail-
ability. We explain the comparison analysis in Table 5.
Integrity
All data transmitted by smart devices should ensure integrity. Moreover, all modules 
inserted in a smart device should keep integrity. In a smart home environment, a variety 
of information is shared by devices, and different types of modules can be inserted in a 
device by a developer or a user. Therefore, it is necessary to provide integrity of mod-
ules, monitor normal activities of modules, and check any modification. The framework 
proposed in this study checks overall codes of a module through self-signing. Before the 
insertion into a device, verification is performed in reference to a hash list. Each module 
has its own roles. If a module tries to play a role not specified, module monitoring exits 
the module by force or makes it turn to ready status and restart the module. In the two 
processes, the operation of module codes is monitored so as to ensure integrity. In the 
case of [12], encryption and hash chain are applied to all data transmitted by manager and 
server in order to provide integrity. A device checks all fragmented hash values and use 
the verified data. In the case of [21], integrity is provided through encryption. In [22], the 
range of integrity is limited. Consumption’s messages are encrypted before transmission, 
so that they are safe against Man-in-the-middle attack. However, in [12, 21, 22], integrity 
is not ensured for the messages or operations of consumption or other appliance modules 
which are already authorized and run normally.
Availability
Availability is the most important factor of all smart devices in a smart home environ-
ment. Lowering availability can lead to the deterioration of the original function of a 
Table 4 Examples of hash values list
Module name Hash values Role table pointer Pointer num
Camera c1ae36d8def8c4242710b4e8544e956c R1 1
RecognizeVoice b1d905f82b6f4c7ab4dc66ed40b896f8 R2 2
StorageMounter 0a2f90d128261d77b2af01342a979971 R3 0
CrashManager 4b9e6227c0117cbf301946eb1a554307 R4 5
Table 5 Comparison analysis
O, strong; △, medium; X, weak








Integrity △ △ △ O
Availability X X △ △
Authentication O O X O
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smart device, which can cause user inconvenience, financial loss, and psychological 
damage. To prevent availability deterioration, the proposed mandatory access control 
framework reads the header of a module and creates and saves a role list. By specifying 
the roles of a module, it is possible to prevent any malicious actions other than the speci-
fied roles. The created list is loaded by module monitoring of appliance integrity protec-
tion framework, and the information section of the module and the list are compared 
before module execution so as to judge the roles of a module and its execution permis-
sion. By addition a role of a module, it is possible to alleviate availability deterioration. 
In [12, 21, 22], availability evaluation is not taken into account. In [21], the limits of All-
Joyn are described. Module transformation can cause optimization and deadlock, so that 
availability can lower. According to the analysis on computation overhead in [22], the 
proposed scheme is able to simplify the vector space used for encryption, and thus there 
is no influence on performance. However, if a malignant module lowers availability, the 
result will be different.
Authentication
All modules inserted into a smart device should be authorized. Authentication process 
is applied to not only existing modules, but newly added modules. It is performed in 
pairing process. When an existing module or a newly added module sends a certificate 
to authentication module in module level, the authentication module receives a return 
value for authentication from the authentication of mandatory access control framework 
in kernel level. The return value is encrypted first and then transmitted to a relevant 
module. In the pairing process, the execution permission of a module is checked. If “not 
Permitted”, the module is not permitted to be executed. In [12], the firmware image 
is transmitted, and an ID is offered differently depending on devices and is encrypted 
before transmission. With the use of the ID, a device is authenticated. In [21], security 
manager issues a certificate-typed security provisioning. Provisioning includes informa-
tion on security group and certificate information membership. Through provisioning, 
authentication is processed. In [22], there is no description of the authentication for 
modules or devices.
Conclusions
As smart home service has gradually been provided for users, the issue of security threat 
has emerged. Most smart devices in a smart home environment fail to ensure security, 
so that they are exposed to many threats. Therefore, this study proposed an internal 
security framework for smart devices in smart home in consideration of data integrity, 
invasion of non-permitted devices, and availability. The proposed framework provides 
the security service for ensuring device authentication, integrity, and availability. The 
framework can have a limited range, for it needs to offer security service in the range 
where the unique functions of a smart device are deteriorated. In the future, it will be 
necessary to propose a more optimized security framework for smart devices, make it 
lightweight, and maximize its availability.
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